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Abstract
Background: Screening and isolation are central components of hospital methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus
(MRSA) control policies. Their prevention of patient-to-patient spread depends on minimizing undetected and
unisolated MRSA-positive patient days. Estimating these MRSA-positive patient days and the reduction in
transmission due to isolation presents a major methodological challenge, but is essential for assessing both the
value of existing control policies and the potential benefit of new rapid MRSA detection technologies. Recent
methodological developments have made it possible to estimate these quantities using routine surveillance data.
Methods: Colonization data from admission and weekly nares cultures were collected from eight single-bed adult
intensive care units (ICUs) over 17 months. Detected MRSA-positive patients were isolated using single rooms and
barrier precautions. Data were analyzed using stochastic transmission models and model fitting was performed
within a Bayesian framework using a Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm, imputing unobserved MRSA carriage
events.
Results: Models estimated the mean percent of colonized-patient-days attributed to undetected carriers as 14.1%
(95% CI (11.7, 16.5)) averaged across ICUs. The percent of colonized-patient-days attributed to patients awaiting
results averaged 7.8% (6.2, 9.2). Overall, the ratio of estimated transmission rates from unisolated MRSA-positive
patients and those under barrier precautions was 1.34 (0.45, 3.97), but varied widely across ICUs.
Conclusions: Screening consistently detected >80% of colonized-patient-days. Estimates of the effectiveness of
barrier precautions showed considerable uncertainty, but in all units except burns/general surgery and one cardiac
surgery ICU, the best estimates were consistent with reductions in transmission associated with barrier precautions.
Background
Patient isolation measures (such as barrier precautions
or physical isolation of patients in single rooms or
cohorts) and screening to detect MRSA colonization are
core components of almost all policies for preventing
the nosocomial transmission of methicillin-resistant Sta-
phylococcus aureus (MRSA). However, there are few
well-designed intervention studies considering screening
and isolation precautions in the absence of other con-
tainment measures, and little is known about the extent
to which they reduce transmission. Obtaining estimates
of any such reduction is important for both quantifying
the value of existing practices and the potential benefit
of new rapid screening technologies.
Screening and isolation measures have two comple-
mentary aims: to minimize the number of days MRSA-
positive patients are left unisolated; and to minimize
MRSA transmission from isolated patients. In this paper
we consider the extent to which we can quantify the
success of control programs in achieving both aims
using routine surveillance data. This presents a number
of challenges. First, the number of unisolated MRSA
patient days usually cannot be directly observed using
surveillance data, because in most settings those who * Correspondence: theodore.kypraios@nottingham.ac.uk
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lated. Moreover, screening cultures are typically taken
no more than weekly. This, combined with less than
perfect swab sensitivity, makes it impossible to directly
observe the total number of colonized patient days, the
number of transmission events and the precise times at
which these events occur. Furthermore, estimating the
effectiveness of isolation measures in reducing transmis-
sion requires quantifying the relative transmission rates
of both known and isolated and unobserved and uniso-
lated MRSA positive patients. This cannot be done with-
out estimates of the number of days MRSA-positive
patients are left unisolated. Together, these obstacles
prevent direct estimates of the efficacy of patient isola-
tion in reducing transmission using routine surveillance
data.
Here we show that data augmentation methods allow
t h e s ep r o b l e m st ob eo v e r c o m eb yt r e a t i n gt h eu n o b -
served times at which patients acquire MRSA as
unknown parameters to be estimated. By analysing such
surveillance data using stochastic transmission models
and making use of data augmentation techniques it is
possible to simultaneously estimate the number of unde-
tected MRSA positive patient days and the efficacy of
isolation measures in reducing transmission using routi-
nely collected MRSA surveillance data.
Methods
Data Collection
We collected detailed census and microbiologic data
from eight adult 10-bed intensive care units (ICUs) in a
tertiary academic medical center in Boston, Massachu-
setts where routine admission and weekly bilateral nares
screening for MRSA was occurring with high compli-
ance (90%). Types of ICUs included medical, cardiac,
general surgery (2), neurosurgery, thoracic surgery, and
cardiac surgery (2). One of the two general surgery
wards also received burn and trauma patients. Dates of
MRSA-positive clinical cultures (all sources), as well as
positive and negative MRSA nares screening cultures
were collected during a 17-month period from Septem-
ber 2003 through January 2005. Negative clinical cul-
tures were not assessed. All specimens were processed
by routine bacterial culturing techniques. This study was
approved by the Institutional Review Board at Brigham
and Women’s Hospital with a waiver of informed
consent.
Newly-identified and previously known MRSA-positive
patients were placed under contact precautions consist-
ing of gown and glove use as well as use of single
rooms (all ICU rooms were single occupant). Once
identified as MRSA-positive, contact precautions were
applied on that admission and all subsequent admis-
sions. No nurse cohorting was utilized. Dates of each
ICU admission and discharge were obtained, along with
the date on which contact precautions were initially
applied (for MRSA or other highly antibiotic resistant
pathogens). The first institutional date of a MRSA-posi-
tive culture was also recorded, even if it preceded the
study period.
Data analysis
Stochastic model
Our baseline analysis used a previously described
dynamic stochastic single-ward transmission model to
analyse the data [1]. At any point in time, each patient
is assumed by this model to be in one of two states,
colonized (defined here as the presence of MRSA at
any body site, regardless of symptoms) or uncolonized.
Each patient entering the ward has a probability j of
being already colonized, unless they are already known
to be so (i.e. having already had a previous positive
test).
During a stay on the ward, an initially uncolonized
patient is assumed to have a risk of becoming colonized
that can be described by a Poisson process: this means
that the probability of a patient becoming colonized
between time t and time t+τ can be approximated by l
(t) τ (where τ is a small interval of time, the approxima-
tion becoming exact as τ approaches zero). Conse-
quently, a patient’s chances of becoming colonized
increase with length of stay on the ward. The rate l (t)
can vary through time; since we are interested in com-
paring different potential sources of colonization we
assume that l (t) = b0 +C ( t ) b1 +I ( t ) b2.H e r e ,b0 is the
rate of background transmission, b1 is the rate of trans-
mission due to colonized but nonisolated patients, b2 is
the rate of transmission due to colonized and isolated
patients, and C(t) and I(t) are the numbers of noniso-
lated and isolated colonized patients at time t,r e s p e c -
t i v e l y .W et h u sa s s u m et h a tt h e“colonization pressure”
on an uncolonized individual increases linearly with the
number of colonized patients who are isolated and noni-
solated. Although it is common practice to use a scaling
such as b1/N instead of b1,w i t hN the typical number
of patients on the ward, this did not seem necessary
s i n c et h e r ew a sv e r yl i t t l ev ariation in ward occupancy
both between wards and between different times during
the study period. The inclusion of the background rate
b0 models the assumption of a constant risk of coloniza-
tion irrespective of the presence of colonized patients.
Such background transmission could, for example, result
from environmental contamination or contact with staff
carriers of MRSA [2-4]. Note that the model takes no
explicit account of HCW compliance with barrier
precautions.
Once a patient is colonized, we assumed that he or
she remains so for a three month period. Thus, a patient
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readmitted within three months. This assumption was
not critical: the results presented below were virtually
unchanged when different periods of colonization were
assumed (e.g. 6 months, 9 months). We assumed that
the nares culture had a specificity of 100% and a sensi-
tivity of p ×1 0 0 % ,w h e r ep (the sensitivity of a nasal
swab for detecting MRSA carriage at any site) was esti-
mated from the data.
Statistical inference
The above model has five main parameters, namely j, p,
b0,b1,a n db2. We wish to estimate these from the data,
which consist of admission times, discharge times, and
the times and outcomes of tests. Since our approach
involves estimating unseen colonization times, we can
also estimate quantities such as the duration of carriage
prior to a positive test result. Assessment of the effec-
tiveness of isolation is performed by comparing esti-
mates of b1 and b2: evidence that b1 > b2would support
the hypothesis that isolation is effective in reducing
transmission. Specifically, we estimate P(b1 > b2)a n d
the ratio b1/b2 . Estimation was carried out within a
Bayesian statistical framework using Markov chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods [5].
The five model parameters were assigned uninforma-
tive and independent prior distributions: Uniform(0,1)
distributions for j and p; and exponential distributions
with rate 10
-6 for each of the b parameters. Since the
likelihood of the observed data (dates and outcomes)
given the model parameters is computationally intract-
able, we used a data augmentation method in which the
unobserved colonization times were included as addi-
tional parameters. This yields an augmented posterior
density that is known up to proportionality, which we
explored using an MCMC algorithm. Within the algo-
rithm, infection rate parameters were updated using
Metropolis-Hastings steps, while both j and p were
updated using Gibbs steps [6].
Our methods enable us to estimate the percent of
patient days that are attributed to patients who are colo-
nized but not yet detected (phidden), and the percent of
patient days attributed to patients who are colonized
and have been tested, but who are awaiting test results
(pwait). Note that phidden > pwait since all “waiting”
patients are also “hidden”.
Some of the parameter estimates were combined using
a random effects model with inverse variance weights
[[7], Sec. 5.2] to derive pooled estimates and corre-
sponding standard errors. These computations were car-
ried out using the rmeta package for R http://www.r-
project.org. All other analysis, such as the implementa-
tion of the MCMC algorithms, was performed using
programs we wrote in C.
Sensitivity analysis
We refer to the model described above as the full
model. To assess the impact of our assumptions, we
repeated the analyses using two alternative models. In
the first (the no-background model), b0 is assumed to be
zero with high probability (specifically, b0 was assigned
an exponential prior distribution with mean 10
-4 so P(b0
< 0.001) > 0.99). This corresponds to the assumption
that virtually all of the MRSA acquisitions result from
patient-to-patient transmission (much of which is pre-
sumably mediated by transiently colonized healthcare
workers, though this is not explicitly modeled). Back-
ground transmission unrelated to colonization pressure,
e.g. environmental contamination, is assumed to be of
negligible importance. In the second (the non-linear
model), the assumption of linearly increasing coloniza-
tion pressure is relaxed, and it is instead assumed that
colonization pressure due tob o t hi s o l a t e da n dn o n i s o -
lated individuals remains constant provided at least one
colonized individual is present. Although biologically
less plausible than the full model, this model represents
an extreme case and by fitting it we obtain insights into
the impact of the assumptions underlying the full
model. For both the non-linear and no-background
models, assessment of the effect of isolation is measured
via comparison of the two rates b1 and b2 as described
above.
Test sensitivity
We consider two definitions of swab sensitivity: swab
sensitivity in detecting colonization of the nares, and
swab sensitivity for detecting colonization at any body
site. The former is calculated from a subset of the data
(without making use of the model) by comparing subse-
quent swabs in patients who have a first positive swab.
Precisely, the sensitivity is estimated by the ratio TP/(TP
+FN) using serial nares cultures alone, where TP and
FN denote total numbers of true positive and false nega-
tive tests on a ward excluding the first positive swab
from each patient. Since patients, once colonized, are
assumed to remain so throughout their ICU stay, TP is
simply the number of positive swabs excluding the first
for each patient episode, and FN the number of negative
swabs that follow an earlier positive for the same
patient. The second reported sensitivity is the parameter
p estimated from the model making use of cultures
from all sites (this is necessarily lower than the sensitiv-
ity for detecting nares carriage).
Results
Descriptive characteristics of the individual ICUs are
shown in tables 1 and 2. The median length of stay was
two days in all but the two General Surgical wards, in
which it was one day. A total of 4,977 MRSA positive
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Thirty three percent of these cultures were nares screen-
ing cultures.
Estimates for b1 were fairly consistent across the
wards while b0 and b2 exhibited more variation (figure
1). General surgery wards were distinguished by the fact
that the estimated transmission rate with barrier precau-
tions (b2) was found to be higher than that without (b1).
Posterior distributions of the three rates were found to
be negatively correlated. This was expected since an
increase in one rate must be accounted for by a
decrease in another. The background rate b0 had con-
siderable correlation with the other two rates (range
-0.23 to -0.58), while b1 and b2 were far less strongly
correlated (range -0.05 to -0.30).
The impact of undetected colonized patients on
transmission
Approximately 15% of colonized patient days (CPDs)
were due to undetected patients, this being made up of
around 10% due to patients awaiting test results, and
about 5% due to patients who had not been tested (table
3 ) .T h ef r a c t i o no fC P Da t t r i b u t e dt ou n d e t e c t e d
patients was not statistically associated with the mean
monthly overall prevalence or admission prevalence of
MRSA in each ICU (Pearson’s correlation coefficient
-0.58 and -0.53, p-values 0.13, 0.17, respectively.)
Is isolation effective? Comparison of b1 and b2
In five of the eight wards there was consistent, though
weak, evidence that b1 is larger than b2 indicating that
isolation is associated with reduced transmissibility
(table 4). The probability of an isolation benefit varied
w i d e l ya c r o s st h eu n i t s ,e . g .2 7 - 8 2 %u n d e rt h ef u l l
model.
Pooled estimate of the effectiveness of isolation
Although our analysis treats each ward individually, it
is nevertheless of interest to consider a pooled estimate
of isolation efficacy. Such an estimate of (b1/b2)a c r o s s
all wards has mean (95% credible interval) 1.34 (0.45,
3.97) which indicates some evidence to support the
efficacy of isolation, but a relatively high degree of
uncertainty. This estimate can be decomposed into
Table 1 Summary statistics for the study data
Ward
a Number of
patients
Length of stay
Mean(SD)
Percent in contact
precaution
b
Number of swab
tests per person
Mean (SD)
Number of MRSA+ swab
tests per person
Mean (SD)
Number of swab tests taken
after first positive
c
M1 1293 3.4 (4.7) 11.4 1.4 (0.8) 0.13 (0.5) 73
M2 1018 4.4 (6.4) 19.1 1.5 (0.9) 0.20 (0.61) 45
GS1 1227 3.4 (5.2) 12.4 1.3 (0.7) 0.14 (0.5) 63
GS2 1030 4.0 (8.3) 10.7 1.4 (0.9) 0.14 (0.5) 99
SS1 706 5.8 (11.4) 12.5 1.3 (0.9) 0.10 (0.5) 100
SS2 888 4.8 (9.7) 7.5 1.4 (1.1) 0.11 (0.6) 111
SS3 1097 3.8 (6.4) 6.0 1.2 (0.7) 0.05 (0.3) 51
SS4 1263 3.6 (5.2) 5.1 1.4 (0.8) 0.07 (0.3) 42
a Here M denotes Medical or Cardiac ICU, GS denotes General Surgical ICU, including trauma and burn patients, SS denotes Specialty Surgical ICU.
b Includes isolation indicators other than MRSA.
c The total number of swab tests taken after the first MRSA-positive test.
Table 2 Observed prevalence and incidence for the study data
Ward
a Monthly MRSA
prevalence
b
Mean (SD)
Monthly MRSA
admission prevalence
c
Mean (SD)
Monthly MRSA incidence density (new cases per 1,000 patient days)
Mean (SD)
M1 16.9 (4.0) 12.6 (3.0) 8.8 (8.1)
M2 23.5 (4.7) 20.6 (3.3) 5.8 (5.8)
GS1 20.5 (5.8) 15.4 (4.2) 9.3 (8.3)
GS2 19.5 (6.4) 10.9 (4.1) 18.2 (9.7)
SS1 21.1 (8.7) 12.9 (7.5) 9.8 (10.1)
SS2 13.8 (4.4) 7.3 (2.8) 6.8 (4.9)
SS3 10.7 (3.9) 6.3 (3.6) 9.4 (7.9)
SS4 9.2 (3.3) 4.5 (3.1) 9.1 (6.1)
a Here M denotes Medical or Cardiac ICU, GS denotes General Surgical ICU, including trauma and burn patients, SS denotes Specialty Surgical ICU.
b The number of ICU patients ever known to be MRSA-positive before or during that month, divided by the total number of ICU patients that month.
c The number of patients ever known to be MRSA positive before or within two calendar days of admission, divided by the total number of monthly admissions.
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Marginal posterior distributions of the colonization rates for each ward.
Figure 1 Marginal posterior distributions of the colonization rates for each ward. Boxplots of the marginal posterior distributions are
shown which contain (the smallest observation, lower quartile (Q1), median (Q2), upper quartile (Q3), and largest observation (sample
maximum) as well as any outliers. The whiskers extend from the edges of the box to the most extreme data point which is no more than 1.5
times the interquartile range away from the box.
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eral surgical wards, yielding 1.89 (0.21 16.60), 1.73
(0.33 8.94) and 0.7 (0.1, 5.0) respectively. Variation
a c r o s sa l lw a r d si si l l u s t r a t ed in Figure 2, which shows
a pooled estimate of log(b1/b2) for the full modeland
the corresponding standard deviation for each ward. In
addition, the value of the I
2 statistic, which describes
the percentage of variation across wards that is due to
heterogeneity, was equal to zero for the aforemen-
tioned pooled estimates.
Test sensitivity
We report the two estimates of swab sensitivity defined
in the methods section (table 5). Overall, the sensitivity
of detecting colonization at any body site was estimated
from the model to be 60% (95% 55%-63%) while the
sensitivity of the nares test was estimated directly from
the data to be 85%.
Percentage of new admissions already colonized
Each patient admitted to a ward during the study period
m a yb ek n o w nt ob ec o l o n i z e dd u et oap r e v i o u sp o s i -
tive test. If not, colonization status is unknown, since
the patient may be either new to the study, or else pre-
viously admitted but with no positive test result. The
parameter j in our model represents the proportion of
such patients who are colonized on admission. Note
that j should not be interpreted as a measure of admis-
sion prevalence, since it excludes known positives.
Estimates of j were found to be similar to the percen-
tage of patients admitted with a known previous positive
test on all wards except M2, with the lowest values
tending to occur in the specialist surgery wards (table
6). Estimates from the full model and no-background
model were similar, as were estimates from the non-lin-
ear model (not shown).
Discussion
We have shown that a data-augmentation approach
allows us to estimate the extent of undetected MRSA
carriage and the effectiveness of barrier precautions
(gown and gloves) in preventing transmission using only
routinely collected high-compliance admission and
weekly MRSA screening cultures. Such estimates would
have been difficult or impossible with more conven-
tional approaches and would have required assuming
rather than estimating the unobserved carriage data.
Our results have shown that admission and weekly
nares screening with conventional culture methods are
likely to have detected at least 80% of MRSA colonized
patient days in the ICUs studied, despite 48-hour cul-
ture turn-around times, and sensitivities to detect
MRSA carriage of only 85% for detecting nares carriage
and 59% for carriage at any body site. The explanation
for this high detection of MRSA patient days despite a
low sensitivity for non-nares sites is that clinical cultures
of other sites are routinely being performed for medical
reasons. Thus, nares screening in conjunction with
usual routine culturing performed for medical reasons
captures a large majority of positive MRSA carriers.
While generalizability to non-ICU wards remains
unclear, this level of detection in ICUs is reassuring
since risk of MRSA infection is highest in these settings.
We estimate that approximately 10% of potential con-
tact precaution days are missed due to delays in
Table 3 Assessment of undetected colonization
Ward Full model No-background Non-linear
phidden pwait phidden pwait phidden pwait
M1 16.5
(14.9,
18.2)
11.5
(10.6,
12.4)
16.6
(14.9,
18.2)
11.4
(10.5,
12.2)
16.4
(14.8,
18.1)
11.5%
(10.6,
12.3)
M2 10.5
(8.3, 13.2)
6.7
(5.6, 7.9)
10.8
(8.4, 13.7)
6.9
(5.8, 8.3)
10.4
(8.1, 13.3)
6.7
(5.5, 8.0)
GS1 13.8
(12.2,
15.5)
8.3
(7.6, 8.9)
13.9
(12.3,
15.6)
8.3
(7.6, 8.9)
13.9
(12.2,
15.5)
8.3
(7.5, 8.9)
GS2 17.3
(15.1,
19.8)
7.4
(6.6, 8.2)
17.3
(15.1,
19.6)
7.3
(6.6, 8.0)
17.4
(15.1,
19.7)
7.5
(6.7, 8.2)
SS1 9.6
(8.1, 11.2)
4.7
(4.4, 4.9)
9.9
(8.4, 11.6)
4.7
(4.4, 4.9)
9.6
(8.1, 11.2)
4.7
(4.4, 4.9)
SS2 10.7
(9.0, 12.7)
5.7
(5.4, 6.1)
10.9
(9.1, 13.0)
5.8
(5.4, 6.1)
10.7
(8.9, 12.8)
5.7
(5.4, 6.1)
SS3 15.6
(13.0,
18.4)
7.9
(6.9, 8.7)
16.2
(13.5,
18.9)
7.8
(6.9, 8.6)
15.5
(12.7,
18.3)
7.9
(6.9, 8.7)
SS4 19.8
(16.2,
23.3)
10.1
(8.7, 11.4)
20.7
(17.1,
24.3)
9.7
(8.4, 10.9)
19.8
(16.5,
23.3)
10.1
(8.6, 11.3)
Note: Model estimates (95% credible intervals) of the mean percent of
colonized-patient-days attributed to undetected colonized patients (phidden),
and the mean percent of colonized-patient-days attributed to colonized
patients who had been swabbed but were waiting for results (pwait).
Table 4 Assessment of isolation efficacy
Ward Full model No-background Non-linear
P(b1 > b2) Median
(b1/b2)
P(b1 > b2) Median
(b1/b2)
P(b1 > b2) Median
(b1/b2)
M1 0.82 2.7 0.83 2.4 0.75 2.3
M2 0.51 1.0 0.54 1.1 0.45 0.8
GS1 0.27 0.5 0.15 0.3 0.36 0.6
GS2 0.50 1.0 0.58 1.2 0.62 1.5
SS1 0.73 2.7 0.57 1.3 0.53 1.1
SS2 0.79 3.3 0.79 2.0 0.71 2.0
SS3 0.44 0.8 0.60 1.3 0.67 2.0
SS4 0.58 1.3 0.70 2.3 0.59 1.4
Note. P(b1 > b2), the probability that b1 is larger than b2, measures the
strength of the evidence that isolation was associated with reduced
transmission (a value of 1 would indicate certainty), and the ratio of b1 to b2
measures the relative infectivity of unisolated compared to unisolated
patients.
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Figure 2 Effectiveness of isolation precautions. Forest plot showing individual and pooled estimate of ln(b1/b2) for each ward. Horizontal
lines are 95% CIs and the size of each square is proportional to weight in the meta-analysis. The end points of the summary diamond indicate
95% CI.
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28.1% reduction in the transmission rate (i.e. 1 - (b2/b1),
using the pooled estimate from all the wards), then an
additional 5% reduction in total transmission rates
would be gained with instantaneous swab results, sug-
gesting a limit to the potential benefit in using rapid
screening technologies. However, the potential benefit of
rapid test results would increase in line with the effec-
tiveness of isolation measures.
While our best estimate is that gown and glove barrier
precautions produce a 28% reduction in MRSA trans-
mission, we recognize that these estimates have consid-
erable uncertainty despite including over 11 ward-years
of data and there is a substantial chance that the effect
is both much lower and much larger. Thus we estimate
that there is 30% chance that the reduction in transmis-
sion is above 44% and a 30% chance that isolation actu-
ally increases transmission.
This uncertainty may indicate that many more years
of data are required, and/or may be explained by the
fact that data from different types of ICUs were pooled.
However the Woolf’s test for heterogeneity did not
reach significance at a 5% level (p = 0.982), indicating
that these differences are consistent with chance. More-
over since comparisons between ward-types were not
planned they may be of value for generating, but not
testing hypotheses.
Recognizing these caveats, it is plausible that barrier
precautions have differential effectiveness in different
types of ICUs. The estimates found in this study suggest
that medical ICUs may derive the most benefit from
barrier precautions. This is important since the MRSA
prevalence in medical ICUs is often higher than in other
ICU types. Interestingly, our results suggest that no ben-
efit was derived in general surgery ICUs serving burn
and trauma patients. It is possible that barrier precau-
tions may be less effective when the burden of MRSA is
profuse, such as with surgical wounds or burns. Such an
interpretation is supported by the fact that the rate of
background transmission (b0) is substantially higher on
these units. This is also supported by other work in
these units suggesting that contamination with MRSA is
higher in surgical versus medical ICUs [8]. Another pos-
sible explanation for the lack of benefit seen in select
wards is low compliance with contact precautions,
although this was not assessed. Finally, if barrier precau-
tions provide a false sense of security and lead to poorer
hand hygiene, then transmission might effectively wor-
sen with this practice.
It is also possible that the differing effectiveness of
barrier precautions among ICUs could be due to
unmeasured effects. Specifically, we did not measure or
account for variations in host risk factors for acquisition
(comorbidities, severity of illness, wounds, devices), nor
did we measure the effect of other ongoing infection
control interventions such as hand hygiene campaigns.
Table 5 Two measures of nares test sensitivity based
upon serial nares cultures
Ward Sensitivity of Detecting
Nares Colonization (%)
a
Sensitivity of detecting
colonization at any body site
(%): Median (95% CI)
b
M1 92 64 (56, 71)
M2 84 56 (47, 65)
GS1 82 61 (54, 69)
GS2 88 50 (42, 57)
SS1 89 62 (54, 68)
SS2 89 68 (60, 76)
SS3 85 55 (45, 64)
SS4 72 54 (44, 65)
Overall 85 59 (55, 63)
a Given by the ratio TP/(TP+FN) where TP is the number of positive swabs
excluding the first for each patient episode and FN the number of negative
swabs that follow an earlier positive for the same patient.
b The parameter p estimated from the model making use of cultures from all
sites.
Table 6 Percentage of patients who are colonized on admission to a ward
Ward No Percent having a previous positive test
a Estimated percent of MRSA carriers among admissions with unknown status
b(j ×
100%): Median (95% CI)
Full Model No Background
M1 8.4 9.4 (7.3, 12) 9.6 (7.5, 12.2)
M2 7.7 14.1 (10.3, 18.6) 14.4 (10.7, 19)
GS1 8.1 10.4 (7.8, 13.4) 10.7 (8.1, 13.9)
GS2 5.7 8.3 (5.4, 12.1) 9.0 (6, 13)
SS1 8.2 8.7 (5.9, 12.2) 9.2 (6.4, 12.7)
SS2 4.6 5.7 (3.8, 8.2) 6.1 (4.2, 8.6)
SS3 4.2 3.4 (2.1, 5.3) 3.8 (2.4, 5.8)
SS4 3.5 4.6 (2.9, 6.9) 5.9 (4.0, 8.4)
a Patients known to be colonized due to having had a previous positive test during the study period (column 2).
b The percentage of patients with unknown status (due to being newly-admitted or with no previous positive test) who are estimated to be colonized on
admission by the model.
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Page 8 of 10We do note that infection control interventions were
not differentially applied to certain ICUs during this
time, but levels of compliance are not known. In the
absence of reliable data about these factors, none were
considered in our analysis.
Our results may underestimate the full effect of bar-
rier precautions since all ICU rooms were single occu-
pancy; thus, we could not assess the impact of this
component. In addition, studies have suggested that
compliance with barrier precautions is around 70%
[9,10]. Our estimates represent estimates of “effective-
ness” (under routine operation) rather than a theoretical
efficacy that would apply only under perfect compliance.
Thus, while our estimates can be considered conserva-
tive, we believe they are the most practically relevant
outcome measures. More precise estimates would
require more prolonged surveillance data, data with
more frequent swabbing intervals, and/or extensive typ-
ing information to help identify transmission routes.
The model-based approach that we have adopted for
data analysis has several advantages over standard statis-
tical methods, yielding more powerful analyses based on
more realistic assumptions. In particular, it accounts for
unobserved but important events (e.g. the time at which
a patient becomes colonized), and attempts to estimate
these events and their uncertainty. It also is based upon
biologically meaningful assumptions regarding transmis-
sion, addressing both environmental sources and
patient-to-patient transfer.
In summary, we have used a stochastic model to esti-
mate the importance of undetected MRSA carriage and
the impact of gown and glove precautions on MRSA
transmission from 11-ICU years of active MRSA surveil-
lance data. Such isolation precautions are the foundation
of infection control guidelines for MRSA control. Never-
theless, there are concerns that isolation techniques may
reduce the quality of patient care and incur risks related
to inattention [11-13]. Thus, quantifying the beneficial
effects and understanding the types of hospital wards in
which such measures are likely to be insufficient is a cri-
tical part of weighing the need for additional or alterna-
tive measures. This work shows that even with
conventional MRSA detection technology and weekly
screening, a very large proportion of the total patient
MRSA reservoir can be detected. It also suggests that
barrier precautions may afford substantial benefit in
medical and possibly specialty surgical ICUs, but that
barriers to its effectiveness may need further study. The
large uncertainty in effectiveness estimates, however,
illustrate the limitations of routine surveillance data and
highlight the need for well-designed prospective inter-
vention studies to evaluate such interventions with
greater precision.
Conclusions
In a study of 8 ICUs performing admission and weekly
nares surveillance, the average percentage of colonized-
patient-days attributed to undetected carriers was 14%,
while the percentage of colonized-patient-days attributed
to patients awaiting test results was 8%. This suggests
that nares surveillance identifies a large majority of car-
riers and that pcr testing may confer only a small bene-
fit over routine culture. Estimates of the effectiveness of
barrier precautions showed an overall benefit of 25%,
but this benefit varied widely across different types of
ICUs.
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